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I. Recent Developments in Indian Capital Markets Regulation
India is now one of the world's fastest growing economies. Its gross domestic product
(GDP) grew by 6.7% in fiscal 2008-2009, while many developed economies contracted
during the same period.' India, however, did not escape the global economic downturn,
and there was a significant adverse impact on Indian companies' abilities to raise capital in
the domestic and international capital markets. In the 2008-2009 fiscal year, capital raised
through initial public offerings (IPOs) dropped to a six-year low, totaling US$432 mil-
lion. 2 But with the "green shoots" of a global economic recovery showing signs in 2009,
and the Indian government's economic stimulus package and commitment to economic
reform, many Indian companies have raised equity in the domestic and international capi-
tal markets in the 2009-2010 fiscal year, including through IPOs and qualified institu-
tional placements (QIPs). 3
Like many of the world's equity market regulators, the Securities and Exchange Board
of India (SEBI) embarked on several reforms to increase the transparency and effective-
* The committee editor for the India Chapter was Douglas Ochs Adler of Vedder Price P.C.
(Washington, D.C.), assisted by Cristina Richards (Vedder Price P.C., Washington, D.C.) and Ravinder
Sahota (The Consumer Advocay Center, Chicago, Illinois). Section I was authored by James Grandolfo,
Partner at Allen & Overy, Hong Kong, and Ajit Sharma, an associate at Trilegal in Mumbai. Section II was
authored by Vandana Shroff, Partner at Amarcgand & Mangaldas Suresh A. Shroff & Co. in Mumbai.
Section I was authored by Rajiv K. Luthra, Founder and Managing Partner at Luthra & Luthra Law Offices
in New Delhi. Section IV was authored by Kavita Mohan, an associate at Baker & Hostetler LLP. Section V
was authored by H. Jayesh, an attorney at Juris Corp. in Mumbai, India. (Mr. Jayesh would like to thank Ms.
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1. See Press Release, Gov't of India, Revised Estimates of Annual National Income, 2008-09 and Quar-
terly Estimates of Gross Domestic Product, 2008-09 (May 29, 2009), available at http://www.mospi.nic.in/
pressnotet4_29may09.pdf.
2. See Swapnil Mayekar, Few Public Offers, Fewer Takers, Bus. STANDARD, Apr. 8, 2009, available at http://
www.business-standard.com/india/news/few-public-offers-fewer-takers/354354/.
3. For more information on stimulus packages see Dr. D. Subbarao Governor, Annual Policy Statement
for the Year 2009-10, Reserve Bank of India (Apr. 21, 2009), http-J/rbi.org.in/scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?
Id=4936&Mode=0. To date, leading India companies, including Adani Power, HDFC Bank, Indiabulls Fi-
nancial Services, and Suzlon, have raised funds via IPOs and QIPs.
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ness of their markets. In September 2009, the SEBI implemented the SEBI Issue of Capi-
tal and Disclosure Requirements Regulations (Regulations).4 The previous rules, known
as the SEBI Disclosure and Investor Protection Guidelines (Guidelines), were first
promulgated in 1992, and last overhauled in 2000.s In the last nine years, the Guidelines
were updated and modified through numerous formal SEBI circulars. The net effect was
to create a body of regulation fraught with ambiguity and uncertainty. The new stream-
lined Regulations replace the Guidelines and are designed to make IPOs and QIPs more
straightforward for Indian companies, and more attractive for domestic and international
investors.
The Regulations clarify the tangled securities regulations, but they maintain the overall
scope or scheme of Indian capital market regulations. While the changes strive to in-
crease market efficiency and transparency, there are some key developments worth noting.
A. ABOLMON OF ELIGIBILITY NoRMs
Under the Guidelines, certain banking and infrastructure companies were able to take
advantage of exceptions from the eligibility norms regulating IPOs, but these exceptions
have been abolished. 6 This represents a vote of confidence in the Indian banking and
infrastructure markets, which no longer need the protection of this favorable policy.
B. OFFERS FOR SALE AND FOLLOW-ON OFFERS
The Regulations also change the rules regarding "offers for sale." Previously, only un-
listed companies pursuing IPOs were allowed to make offers for sale.7 By altering the
Regulations' definition of "further public offer," listed companies may now make addi-
tional sales of their equity securities.8 The Regulations allow offers for sale to be made
within one year of the filing of draft offer documents with the SEBI.9
C. CREATION OF THE "ANCHOR INVESTOR" CATEGORY
In June 2009, SEBI issued a circular creating a category of IPO investors called the
"anchor investors," which is the equivalent of what is known in the international capital
4. See Securities and Exchange Board of India (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirement) Regulations,
No. LAD-NRO/GN/2009-10/15/174471 (Aug. 26, 2009) [hereinafter Regulations], available at http://
www.sebi.gov.in/guide/sebiidcrreg.pdf.
5. Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), (Disclosure and Investor Protection) Guidelines of
2000 (2009) [hereinafter Guidelines], available at http://www.sebi.gov.in/guide/sebidipguideaug09.pdf.
6. See Guidelines, cl. 2.2.1(a), 2.4 (which exempted a banking company and an infrastructure company
from the eligibility norms mentioned in the Guidelines, including, amongst others, the requirement to have
net tangible assets of Rs. 3 crores (approximately $780,000). This exemption from complying with eligibility
requirements has now been done away with in the new Regulations.).
7. See Guidelines, cl. 2.2.3.
8. See Regulations cl. 2(1)(n).
9. See Regulations cl. 26(6).
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markets as the "cornerstone investor."' 0 Later, this change was incorporated in the new
Regulations.
In Indian public offerings, generally sixty percent of the offered shares are reserved for
subscription from qualified institutional buyers (QIBs)."1 The anchor investor rules allow
the reservation of up to thirty percent of the QIB allotment to be sold to anchor investors
through a bidding process subject to a thirty-day lock-up following the closing of the
IPO.12 Under the Regulations, anchor investors are QIBs with a minimum application/
bid value of approximately $2.1 million. 13 The bidding by anchor investors takes place the
day before the shares are offered to the public and results must be disclosed before the
public sale begins.
The introduction of the anchor investor concept is expected to reduce pre-IPO private
placements and give confidence to retail investors to bid for securities in the IPO. Anchor
investor backing traditionally provides a market signal as to IPO issuer strength. Since
SEBI introduced the anchor investor category, several Indian companies have completed
their IPOs with the inclusion of anchor investors.14 Market commentators have suggested
that the success of these deals was in part due to having such investors involved.' 5
D. REGULATION OF PROMOTERS
In India, promoters (otherwise known as "significant shareholders") are a key part of the
IPO process because of the active roles they generally play in the management of the
company. For this reason, investors in Indian companies often place a premium on pro-
moters when making investment decisions. In recognition of this reliance, SEBI altered
some disclosure requirements for promoters to strengthen investor transparency.16
In an IPO, the Guidelines, and now the Regulations, require that promoters contribute
at least twenty percent of the post-issue capital, signaling the promoters' commitment to
the financial health and proper management of the issuer.17 Previously, part of that capi-
tal was provided by promoter groups who were made up of friends, relatives, and associ-
ates of the actual promoters.' 8 The Regulations are now more restrictive, requiring that
10. SEBI, Introduction of Concept of Anchor Investor in Public Issues through Book Building Route,
Circular No. CFD/DIL/DIP/36/2009/09/07 (July 9, 2009) [hereinafter Anchor Investor Circular], available
at http://www.sebi.gov.in/circulars/2009/cfdcir362009.pdf.
11. See SEBI, Securities Contracts (Regulation) Rules, 1957, rule 19(2)(b), available at http://www.sebi.gov.
in/acts/act02c.pdf.
12. See Anchor Investor Circular ch. XI.
13. See Regulations cl. 10(1), sched. XI.
14. See Ahmedabad, Adani IPO Brings Anchor Investors, TIMEs OF INDIA, July 28, 2009, http://timesofindia.
indiatimes.com/biz/india-business/Adani-IPO-brings-anchor-investors/articleshow/
4 8 2 7757.cms. For exam-
ple, Adani Power Ltd. and Indiabulls Power Ltd. completed their IPOs recently with the inclusion of anchor
investors.
15. See id.
16. SEBI amended the SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 1997 on Janu-
ary 21, 2009 and inserted Regulation 8A, which requires promoters of a listed company to disclose details of
shares pledged by them. For more information, see Press Release, SEBI Press Release No.58/2009 (Jan. 21,
2009) [herinafter SEBI Press Release], available at http://www.sebi.gov.in/press/2009/200958.htnl.
17. See Regulations cl. 32(1).
18. See id. cl. 2(l)(za).
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only promoters who are disclosed as such in the offering document count toward reaching
this minimum capital contribution requirement.' 9
Additionally, promoters must disclose any pledges made on their shares of the issuer
company.20 Indian markets generally view the pledging of one's shares as one of the last
resorts for the raising of capital. The share pledges also have pricing implications because
they can lead to changes in ownership and control of the issuer. As a result, SEBI now
requires promoters to disclose pledges so that investors can take this information into
account when evaluating an investment in such a company.21
Lastly, under the Guidelines, the employees and directors of an issuer's subsidiaries and
holding companies were considered to be employees of the issuer when allocating stock
reserved for the issuer's employees. 22 This provided promoters with a means to provide
friends, relatives, and associates with "cheap stock," by appointing them to the boards of
minor subsidiaries. Now, only the employees and directors of the actual issuer count as
actual employees. 23 As a result, more shares are reserved for purchase by true employees.
E. CLARIFICATION OF THE OFFER PERIOD
Under the Guidelines, when an issuer revised the price band in a book-building issue,
there was considerable confusion as to the length of the offer period. The Regulations
now require that an offer period not exceed ten days, whether or not there is a band
revision. 24
F. EXTENSION OF THE VALIDITY PERIOD OF SEBI OBSERVATION LETTERS
In December 2008, just months after the Lehman Brothers collapse and amidst the
capital market turmoil, SEBI extended the validity period of its observation letters2s from
three months to twelve.26 If the period lapses without the completion of the offering, an
issuer has to re-file the draft red herring prospectus with the SEBI. This change offers
greater flexibility and was necessary because many Indian issuers were unable to complete
their IPOs due to negative market forces.
19. Id. cl. 2(1)(zb).
20. SEBI Press Release No.58/2009, supra note 16.
2 1. Id.
22. See Guidelines cl. 1.2.1 (xii-b).
23. See Regulations cl. 2(l)(m).
24. See id. cl. 46(1).
25. An unlisted company seeking to raise capital through an IPO in India is required to file a draft red
herring prospectus (DRHP) with SEBI in compliance with the Regulations. SEBI typically issues observa-
tions on the DRHP, which the issuer is expected to incorporate in the red herring prospectus filed with the
Registrar of Companies and SEBI prior to the opening of the IPO. Previously, the Guidelines required that
the IPO should close within three months of the date of SEBI observation letter. This.has now been ex-
tended to twelve months. See id.
26. See Press Release, SEBI Board Meeting Minutes, PR No. 283/2008 (Dec. 4, 2008), available at http//
www.sebi.gov.in/press/2008/2008283.html.
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G. PARTICIPATION OF RETAIL INVESTORS IN PUBLIC ISSUES
Under the Guidelines, if retail investors wished to bid for shares, they would need to
pay the full amount of their bid up front. If the bid was not accepted in full, the investors
had to wait for their money to be refunded. The Regulations now permit the use of the
"application/bid for shares supported by a blocked amount" facility (ASBA).27 The syndi-
cate bank can freeze the investment amount in the investor's account pending the resolu-
tion of the allotment, and then unfreeze any unused portion. 28 This mechanism provides
retail investors with greater flexibility and liquidity in their investing choices, and is a
mandatory feature for all book-built issues.
H. SuMMARY
The SEBI reforms are designed to streamline and clarify existing rules and regulations
to make the Indian capital markets friendlier for issuers and investors. The new Regula-
tions clarify and update the old Guidelines in order to promote market efficiency and
transparency. More than simply cleaning house, this is an important step toward improv-
ing the attractiveness of the Indian capital markets.
II. Foreign Currency Derivatives Litigation in India
The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) regulates foreign currency derivatives (forex deriva-
tives). RBI does not permit speculative trading in forex derivatives, and Indian
counterparties must enter into forex derivatives to hedge genuine underlying foreign cur-
rency risk. In the financial crisis of 2007-2008, the U.S. dollar (USD) weakened against
global currencies. Many Indian corporations had hedged their underlying currency risk
due to volatility in foreign currency exchange rates. They entered into forex derivative
transactions with Indian banks on the basis of a strong USD.
Due to a sharp fall in the value of the USD-the Euro appreciated against the USD by
17.8%, the yen by more than 16%, and the Swiss Franc by 21% 29-counterparties with
exposure to forex derivatives suffered losses estimated to be between US$2 and 7 billion.30
Several Indian corporations, challenging terms of the forex derivative contracts, filed suits.
Because banks also reported losses from counterparty defaults to the tune of several hun-
dred million dollars, recovery suits were filed in the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT),
which is a specialized tribunal constituted under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and
Financial Institutions Act of 199331 for the "expeditious adjudication and recovery of debts
due to banks and financial institutions."
Three theories were advanced in suits by Indian corporations. First, forex derivative
contracts were void ab initio because (a) they merely speculated on movements in foreign
exchange thereby triggering the ban on "wagers" and "speculative contracts" under the
27. For more information on the ASBA mechanism, see Regulations cl. 2(1)(d), 58.
2 8. Id.
29. Tamal Bandyopadhyay, Stung Firms Want Banks to Pay, LIVEMINr, Mar. 17, 2008, http://www.
livemint.com/2008/03/17002646/Stung-firms-want-banks-to-pay.html.
30. Id.
31. The Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, No. 51 of 1993; India Code
(1993).
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Indian Contract Act of 187232 and (b) there was no underlying exposure in these transac-
tions as required by RBI regulations. Second, banks had induced companies to enter into
the relevant transactions on the basis of misrepresentations and inadequate risk disclosures
about these complex derivative products. Third, the banks did not ensure (a) that
counterparties had a risk management policy, as mandated by RBI, and (b) in-principle
compliance with the Comprehensive Guidelines on Derivatives dated April 20, 2007
(Guidelines)33 by undertaking the necessary diligence and assessing the suitability of the
counterparties.
The banks argued that forex derivative contracts did not qualify as a wager under con-
tract law, 34 and that the element of speculation did not in itself make it a wager. Moreo-
ver, forex derivatives had legal recognition under the Reserve Bank of India Act 1934 (RBI
Act)35 as amended in 2006.36 The media reported that some banks also wanted to involve
the RBI in these litigations. 37 In addition, these banks countered that the allegations of
inducement and misrepresentation were vague and made to avoid payment or defer
liability.38
The primary issue relating to forex derivatives, whether they were "wagering contracts,"
and therefore, void ab initio under the Contract Act, was first settled by the Madras High
Court in Rajshree Sugars and Chemicals Limited v. AXIS Bank Limited (Rajshree). 39 Raj-
shree challenged the legality of USD-Swiss Franc derivative transactions.40 The Court
held that forex derivative contracts were valid in law and not wagering contracts because:
(1) there was no common intention to wager; (2) actual delivery of the contract could be
compelled; and (3) there was an actual interest of the parties in currency fluctuations.41
But, a division bench of the Madras High Court stayed the decision, and the final word on
this issue is awaited.42
32. The Indian Contract Act, No. 9 of 1872; India Code (1872).
33. See The Reserve Bank of India, Comprehensive Guidelines on Derivatives, RBI Circular (RBI/2006-
2007/333 DBOD.No.BP.BC. 86/21.04.157/2006-07) (2007), available at http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/BS
CircularIndexDisplay.aspxId=3432.
34. To be characterized a wagering contract (1) there must be a common intention to wager, with each
party holding opposite views from the other on the future uncertain event; (2) upon determination of the
event, one must win and the other must lose; and (3) the actual interest of the parties is not in the occurrence
of the event itself but in their stake in the occurrence. Rajshree Sugars & Chemicals Ltd. v. AXIS Bank Ltd.,
[2008] MANUffN/0893/2008, C.S. No. 240 of 2008 T 55 (Madras H.C.), available at http://www.indianka-
noon.org/doc/149400.
35. The Reserve Bank of India Act, No. 2 of 1934; India Code (2009).
36. Id. ch. IIID.
37. Tamal Bandyopadhyay, Banks Look to Bring RBI into Lawsuits, LrvEMiNrr, Mar. 24, 2008, httpI/
www.livemint.com/2008/03/24001440/Banks-look-to-bring-RBI-into-.html.
38. Id.
39. Rajshree Sugars & Chems. Ltd., MANU/TN/0893/2008.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Rajshree obtained a stay on October 20, 2008 from a division bench of the Madras High Court. See
Rajshree Gets High Court Stay in Derivatives Case, Bus. STANDARD, Oct. 21, 2008, http://www.business-
standard.com/india/news/rajshree-gets-high-court-stay-in-derivatives-case/337883/.
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ICICI Bank has also obtained a favorable order in which the Bombay High Court or-
dered payment of a disputed amount due under a forex derivative contract.4 3 In addition,
Kotak Mahindra Bank was successful in referring a suit to arbitration.44
Other proceedings instituted by banks include those for recovery of amounts due from
counterparties, either in the DRT or in arbitration. A recent Indian Supreme Court judg-
ment held that independent suits filed by counterparties in civil courts, including those in
relation to the derivatives dispute, could not be transferred to the DRT at the behest of
the banks.45
Also, in what has given a public law perspective to an essentially private contractual
dispute, the Orissa High Court heard a public interest claim alleging that banks dealing in
forex derivative products with corporate clients have, in connivance with the government,
"defrauded" Indian companies.46 After hearing the petition in August 2009, the Orissa
High Court ordered a probe by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). In November
2009, the CBI submitted a report finding prima facie evidence of violations of foreign
exchange laws in the alleged scam and recommending that the violations be thoroughly
investigated by the RBI and Enforcement Directorate.47 The RBI has also filed a counter
affidavit with the court in this matter, but the contents of the affidavit are not known.48
Reacting to the fiasco, the RBI has extended the applicability of the Guidelines, which,
until recently, applied only to rupee derivatives or to over-the-counter (OTC) forex deriv-
atives by way of a Master Circular issued in July 2009.49 The Guidelines, inter alia, con-
tain broad principles of risk management as well as the banks' obligations to undertake
due diligence of "user appropriateness" and "suitability" of products being sold to corpo-
rate counterparties.50 Though it would not affect pending litigation, the RBI issued draft
guidelines on November 12, 2009 on OTC forex derivatives and hedging commodity
price risk and freight risk overseas, and invited comments from the public. The draft
guidelines incorporate the Guidelines with certain changes in light of worldwide financial
market developments.
The Central Government is also grappling with the issue of regulatory overlap of deriv-
ative markets. While two reports recommend that derivatives regulation be made solely
43. ICICI Bank Ltd. v. Sundaram Multipap Ltd., Co., [2008] Petition No. 248 of 2008 (Madras H.C.),
available at http://www.livemint.com/A68D99A9-3844-4C30-82C7-E1831D616B2IArtVPF.pdf.
44. Sundaram Brake Linings v. Kotak Mahindra Bank, [2008] Petition No. 139 of 2008 (Madras H.C.).
45. Nahar Indus. Enters. Ltd. v. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp., [20081 MANU/SC/1330/2009
(India).
46. Nageshwar Patnaik, Orissa High Court Orders CBI Probe into Multi-Crore Derivative Scam, EcoN. TIMES
(Aug. 28, 2009), http://econonictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics/nation/Orissa-High-Court-orders-CBI-
probe-into-multi-crore-derivative-scam-/articleshow/4946141.cms.
47. Derivative Scam: CBI Submits Report to Court, HINDu, Nov. 5, 2009, available at http://www.thehindu.
com/2009/11/05/stories/2009110556400300.htm .
48. Id.; Neha Pal, Banks Violated FEMA in Forex Derivatives Contracts: CB1, FIN. EXPRESS, Nov. 9, 2009,
http://www.financialexpress.com/news/banks-violated-fema-in-forex-derivatives-contracts-cbi/538917/2.
49. See Reserve Bank of India, Master Circular on Risk Management and Inter-Bank Dealings, RBI/2008-
09/19 Master Circular No. 06/2008-09 (2008) [hereinafter Master Circular RBI/2008-09/19), available at
httpi//rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/notification/PDFs/85346; Reserve Bank of India, Master Circular on Risk
Management and Inter-Bank Dealings, RBI/2009-10/26 Master Circular No. 06/2009 (2009) [hereinafter
Master Circular RBI/2009-10/26, available at http://rbidoes.rbi.org.in/rdocs/notificationIPDFs/26MCRMOI
0709.pdf.
50. Master Circular RB11/2008-09/19, supra note 49; Master Circular RBI/2009-10/26, supra note 49.
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the responsibility of the SEBI,s' the RBI in a recent publication has expressed the view
that the Central Bank, which regulates at least one of the entities in a derivatives transac-
tion, is best suited for the role of the single regulator. 52
Forex derivatives continue to be an important tool for commercial risk management
and are essential for the healthy development of the Indian financial markets. The RBI,
corporations, and banks must continue to work together to address systemic weaknesses,
remove ambiguities, and standardize laws and market practices regarding such instru-
ments to prevent future litigation.
M. New ISP Liability Rules in India
While the Information Technology Enabled Services (ITES) and the Business Process
Outsourcing (BPO) services sector have made India a household name all over the world,
internet penetration and access in India has been hampered by lack of awareness, high
access costs, and lack of adequate infrastructure. A largely outbound use of information
technology in India made issues such as liability of internet service providers (ISP) largely
academic until a few years ago, when the increasing availability of online pornography,
unlicensed software, and unlicensed music and films prompted more frequent internet use
domestically.
Studies in India claim some "81 million people in India are connected to the In-
ternet,"5 3 although this number remains low in comparison to China where some 298
million people are connected.54 Coupled with the proliferation of wireless internet access
and the impending introduction of 3G technology,5 5 the medium's relevance in India now
also encompasses more than 400 million cellular phone users.
A. CALLS TO PROTECT THE ISP's
With the steady emergence of the internet in India, calls for insulating the so-called
"engines" of the internet from liability increased to a crescendo after the December 2004
arrest of the CEO of eBay's Indian subsidiary, bazee.com, on charges of being complicit in
the distribution of pornography. Up until the recent amendments to the Information
Technology (IT) Act 2000, the liability provision for "network service providers" man-
dated that they exercise "all due diligence" to prevent commission of an offence or contra-
vention.5 6 The provision permitted both criminal or civil proceedings against the entity,
51. Ministry of Fin., Gov't of India, Report of the High Powered Expert Committee on Making Mumbai
an International Financial Centre xxvi (2007), available at http://www.finmin.nic.in/mifc/mifcreport.pdf;
Planning Comm'n, Gov't of India, A Hundred Small Steps: Report of the Committee on Financial Sector
Reform 12 (2007), available at http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/genrep/repfr/cfsrz-all.pdf.
52. Reserve Bank of India, Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India 2008-09 267 (2009), available
at http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Publications/PDFs/RTP0809PRDFull.pdf.
53. See Sriram Vadlamani, With 81 Million Internet Users, India Is Ranked 4th Globally, TRAK.tN, Dec. 12,
2008, http:I/trak.in/tags/business/2008/12/03/with-81-million-intemet-users-india-is-ranked-4th-globally/.
54. China Internet Network Info., The 23rd Statistical Survey Report on Internet Development in China,
China Internet Network Information Center (2009), available at http://www.cnic.net.cn/uploadfiles/pdf/
2009/l/13/92458.pdf.
55. Two state run telecom service providers already offer 3G services.
56. See The Information Technology Act, § 79, No. 1, Acts of Parliament, 2000 [hereinafter Information
Technology Act 2000] (stating that: (a) "Network Service Provider" means an intermediary, (b) "Third Party
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which meant the arrest of top management (as in the bazeecom case) and injunctions in
civil proceedings to restrain copyright infringement. Compliance with such injunctions
was almost never feasible, resulting in frequent claims of contempt of court. Section 79 of
the IT Act 2000s7 was considered completely at odds with the prevailing world trend to
limit liability for online actors in certain situations.
Initially, vociferous objections by rights owners and law enforcement agencies resulted
in the draft amendments being referred to the Parliament Standing Committee on IT.
After taking evidence and seeking the views of "stake holders," which included law en-
forcement agencies such as the Central Bureau of Investigation,5 the Committee ap-
proved of the proposed amendments to Section 79,59 which sought to follow the E.U.
Directive on E-Commerce 2000/3 1/EC, issued on June 8, 2000, by providing that ISP
would not be liable at the outset, and providing for compliance procedures for ISP
through take-down provisions.60 According to the Expert Committee,61 this revision was
done in order to create a "legal framework to ensure the free movement of information
society services between Member States" by establishing definitions, liability, obligations,
and benefits under European Union law for Information Society Services including ISPs
within Europe. 62 While the bill was approved by Parliament quickly and without debate
in December 2008, the required notification by the Government was not issued until Oc-
tober 27, 2009, thus bringing the amendments and rules attendant of the Act into effect as
of that date.63
B. BROADLY DEFINING "IN'TERMEDLARIES"
The amendment defines "intermediary" with respect to any electronic record,64 replac-
ing the narrower term network service provider.65 The new definition specifically classi-
Information" means any information dealt with by a network service provider in his capacity as an
intermediary).
57. Id.; see also The Information Technology (Amendment) Act 2008 § 79, No. 10; India Code (2009) [here-
inafter Information Technology Amendment 2008].
58. Including law enforcement agencies such as the Central Bureau of Investigation which opposed diluting
the "ISP liability provision." See Information Technology Act 2000, § 79 (stating that the proposed amend-
ments to Section 79 would "enable" criminals).
59. DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATIONS & INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY, GOV'T OF INDIA, REPORT OF THE EXPERT COMMITIEE: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT 2000 CH. IX SEC. 44 (2005), available at http://www.mit.gov.in/
download/ITAct.doc.
60. DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATIONS & INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY, GOVT OF INDIA, REPORT OF THE EXPERT COMAMTTEE: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY Act 2000, summary T 17 (2005), available at http://www.mit.gov.in/
download/Summary-final.doc.
61. DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, REPORT OF THE EXPERT COMMITTEEE, PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO INFO. TECH. Acr oF 2000, ITAA (P)-2005 (2005), http://www.mit.gov.in/defaultASPX?
id=220 (constituted by the Department of Information Technology, Ministry of Communications & Informa-
tion Technology, Gov't of India, to suggest the ambit and language of the proposed amendments).
62. Council Directive 2000/31/EC, 2000 OJ. (L 178) 1-16.
63. Press Release, Bureau Mumbai, Ministry of Communication & Information Technology, Information
Technology (Amendment) Act, 2008 Comes into Force (Oct. 27, 2009), http://pibmumbai.gov.in/scripts/
detail.asp?releaseld=E2009PRI 153.
64. Information Technology Amendment 2008 § 2(w).
65. Id. § 79.
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fies intermediaries as including "telecom service providers, Internet service providers,
web-hosting service providers, search engines, online payment sites, online auction sites,
online market places, and cyber cafes." 66 This broad and unprecedented definition leaves
no doubt about the identity of the parties protected under the new Section 79.67
C. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY FOR "INTERMEDIARIES"
The new Section 79 provides immunity to intermediaries in relation to liabilities arising
not only under the IT Act 2000 but also by virtue of a non-obstante clause 68 for liabilities
arising under any law in force in India. Intermediaries have been provided this safe harbor
for any "third party information, data, or communication link made available or hosted by
the intermediary." 69 Thus, this extension of immunity apparently includes every conceiv-
able criminal or actionable act, including acts of defamation, obscenity, and more perti-
nently, claims of copyright and trademark infringement. There are limits, however, as
Section 79 makes clear that the protection is only available to intermediaries, such as
online auction sites, search engines, and web-hosting services who: (a) provide access to a
"communication system" over which third-party content is transmitted or temporarily
stored or hosted; or (b) do not (1) initiate communication, (2) select the recipient, and (3)
select or modify the information contained in the transmission. 70
Section 79(2)(c) requires intermediaries, in addition to the twin tests above, to observe
"due diligence" 71 while discharging their duties under this Act and also provides this "safe
harbor" for any intermediary who "also observes such other guidelines as the Central
Government may prescribe in this behalf."72
Section 79(3) also clarifies that the safe harbor provision of Section 79(1) does not apply
if:
(a) the intermediary has conspired or abetted or aided or induced, whether by threats
or promise or otherwise in the commission of the unlawful act; (b) upon receiving
actual knowledge, or on being notified by the appropriate Government or its agency
that any information, data or communication link residing in or connected to a com-
puter resource controlled by the intermediary is being used to commit the unlawful
act, the intermediary fails to expeditiously remove or disable access to that material
on that resource without vitiating the evidence in any manner.73
D. WHAT CONST-UTES "DUE Dn IGENCE"?
There is little judicial precedent defining the term "due diligence" vis-a-vis online in-
termediaries in India. In the case of Avnish Bajaj v. State of Delhi, the Delhi High Court
66. Id. § 2(w).
67. Id. § 79.
68. Notwithstanding anything contained in other law for the time being in force.
69. Information Technology (Amendment) Act 2008, § 79(1).
70. Id. § 79 (2).
71. Due Diligence has not been defined in the IT [Amendment] Act 2008. The definition will thus more
likely be subject to judicial interpretation.
72. Information Technology Act 2000, § 73(c).
73. Id. § 79(3).
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considered the alleged culpability of bazee.com, its managing director, and other corpo-
rate officers on charges of publication and distribution of pornographic material over the
internet.74 The Court examined the business of the portal before the hosting of the por-
nographic materials and after discovery of the materials. 75 The Court, while noticing the
presence of a filter for objectionable material, observed that the filters were "rudimentary,
grossly inadequate, and perfunctory," and that "[v]arious other interactive web portals like
jeevansaathi.com, naukri.com, etc. adopt various measures like delayed insertion and regu-
lar online monitoring. [Thus] even the established industry norms to prevent offensive
content from coming up on websites were totally ignored."7 6
The Court also noted that:
[T]he investigation reveals that the policies and conduct of bazee.com [and] its [Man-
aging Director] was designed to increase sale and maximize profits. Safeguard of
prevailing moral values and prurient interests of any person in particular and the
society at large was not a pressing agenda. The investigations found that the policy
makers of the company were negligent in dealing with the matter and failed to exer-
cise due diligence.77
While the Court dismissed the managing director from the proceedings in this case, it did
find sufficient grounds for the criminal prosecution against the company and certain
named employees.78
Clearly, the due diligence required by an intermediary to be covered by the safe harbor
in Section 79(1) relates to industry best practices and requires a fact-based showing of how
and when an intermediary's internal checks and filtering were implemented. The ambigu-
ity presented by the term due diligence means that intermediaries, even after the amend-
ment, may be liable for an insufficient exercise of due diligence and, more importantly,
still bear the burden of proving that there was indeed an exercise of due diligence com-
mensurate with industry best practices.
E. LIMITED IMMUNITY
At first blush, Section 79(1) appears to provide immunity to online intermediaries, and
Section 79(2)(c) imposes a due diligence condition for an intermediary to qualify for im-
munity. This is different from the laws in other jurisdictions, such as the safe harbor
provision in the United States for copyright infringement 79 or the E.U. Directive on E-
Commerces 0 which provides immunity to intermediaries based on the type of acts with
which they are associated, such as access-only entities or entities that do not select recipi-
ents and the information or modify the information made available.
Under the now-repealed language of Section 79 "network service providers" were
deemed not to be liable if they proved that they had exercised "due diligence." Under the
74. Avnish Bajaj v. State, 150 DLT 279 (May 2008) (India).
75. Id. I 1.1.
76. Id. 1 19.3.
77. Id.
78. Id. 1 19.5.
79. Limitations on Liability Relating to Material Online, Copyright Law, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (1998).
80. Council Directive 2000/31, 2000 OJ. (L 178) 1-16 (EC).
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revised provision, the requirement to exercise due diligence remains8l and is linked to yet-
to-be-authored guidelines to be prescribed by the Central Government of India, which
adds an unfortunate element of uncertainty. This provision was inserted upon objections
from the Parliamentary Standing Committee, which had favored intermediaries being re-
quired to initiate due diligence procedures as a matter of normal course.82
A further condition of network service provider immunity is reflected in Section 79(3),
which mandates that Section 79(1) shall not apply when the intermediary fails to remove
objectionable material expeditiously upon receiving actual knowledge or notification from
the Government or its agencies.83 This "take-down" provision mirrors current legislation
in many countries but does not contain provisions for "counter notices" by third parties
who have uploaded what may be claimed to be objectionable or infringing content on the
intermediary's resources.84 The concern is that in the absence of a counter notice provi-
sion, intermediaries and individuals may be open to claims of harassment without recourse
to a remedy for opposing take-down notices received from parties claiming, for example,
defamation or copyright infringement.
F. SuMMARY
While the amendment is a step forward and is reflective of the trend towards an increas-
ing internet economy, a careful reading reveals ambiguity and uncertainty about the actual
effect of the "safe harbor" provision. Given the ambiguities present in Section 79, the
provision will no doubt be assessed and reassessed by the courts in India until a definitive
Indian Supreme Court ruling is obtained. It must also be remembered that even given
somewhat similar provisions in other jurisdictions, such as the United States or Europe,
this ambiguity has not prevented owners from initiating legal proceedings based on claims
of primary and secondary infringement of copyright against large online intermediaries,
such as YouTube and Google. While the basic intention of the amendment is clear, what
is unclear is whether the provisions will assist in stemming piracy, preventing online in-
termediaries from being harassed by frivolous legal proceedings, and assisting IP owners
to efficiently monetize their IP. This is perhaps a tall order.
IV. India and the WTO Doha Round
India has emerged as a leading voice in the Doha Round negotiations.85 The Doha
Development Round is the current trade negotiation round of the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO). India's leadership is not surprising. India was one of the original con-
tracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT) in 1947, and was
81. By insertion of the disjunctive sub-clause (c) to Section 79 clause (2). Information Technology (Amend-
ment) Act 2008, § 79(2)(c).
82. Parliamentary Standing Committee, Report on the Amendments to the Information Technology Act
2000, (July 9, 2007).
83. Information Technology (Amendment) Act, § 79(3).
84. For example, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act enacted in America. See, e.g., The Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
85. See India Makes Global Moves with Trade Talks Meet, FIN. EXPRESS, Sept. 3, 2009, available at httpJ/
www.financialexpress.com/printer/news/512105/ (noting that India has been a lead negotiator on behalf of
emerging countries).
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a founding member of the WTO in 1995. India is a savvy negotiator and frequent com-
plainant in WTO disputes. India has been part of the inner circle of negotiators since
early in the negotiations and was one of the founding members of the G-20.86 India's
leadership role also may have developed in part because, as United States Trade Represen-
tative (USTR) Ron Kirk noted recently, India is "uniquely positioned" to be an "honest
broker" in the sense that it represents both "what is going to be one of the real emerging
economies in the world but at the same time can be a powerful applicant for the needs of
the poorest countries."87
Some have argued that India's leadership on behalf of the developing countries led to
the July 2008 stalemate in the negotiations, when then-Commerce Minister Kamal Nath
declared he would not risk the livelihoods of millions of farmers.88 Although there were a
host of reasons for the breakdown in talks, the final stand-off in July 2008 was triggered by
disagreements-primarily among the United States, India, and China-regarding the spe-
cial safeguard mechanism (SSM) threshold that would allow developing countries to im-
pose a tariff on imports of heavily subsidized agricultural products from the developed
world in the event of a drop in prices or surge in imports.89 Little progress can be re-
ported as of the time this article was submitted for publication; despite several multilateral
and bilateral discussions during the latter half of 2009, there were no significant break-
throughs with regard to key issues such as agriculture, non-agriculture market access
(NAMA), or services.
WTO negotiations were virtually suspended during the first half of 2009. As the
Obama Administration was getting settled in, India was busy with its own elections. In
May 2009, the elections in India resulted in a major victory for the Congress-led United
Progressive Alliance and a defeat for India's Communist Party. The election results were
cited as a reason that India might be in a position to move forward more confidently in the
negotiations. 90 This prediction seemed to play out when New Delhi played host to more
than thirty-five members of the WTO on September 3-4, 2009.91 By hosting these meet-
ings, India signaled to the world that it wished to lead the way to a positive outcome in the
negotiations.
The meeting in New Delhi was important because it was the first such gathering since
July 2008, with ministers from practically all major blocs in attendance, including the G-
10, G-33, G-20, NAMA 11, Least Developed Countries, Small and Vulnerable Econo-
mies, African Group, Cotton 4, and others. 92 But despite claims of a breakthrough in the
86. See ATUL KAUSHIK, BRIEFING PAPER: NDIA's STAND IN THE WTO DottA RoUND (2009), http://
www.cuts-citee.org/pdflBPO9-WTO-0 1.pdf.
87. G. Srinivasan, Arbitrary Deadline Feasible on Doha Round Now, HINDU Bus. LINE, Oct. 28, 2009.
88. See Rhys Blakely, India Blamed for Doha Collapse by Trying to Protect Poor Farmers, TLMEs ONLINE, July
30, 2008, http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/economics/article4427725.ece.
89. See World Trade Talks End in Collapse, BBC NEws, July 29, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/
7531099.stm.
90. See Tripti Lahiri, New Delhi 'Breakthrough' Sets Restart of Doha Round Ag, NAMA Talks for Sept. 14, 26
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1191 (Sept. 10, 2009), available at http://www.bna.con/itr/arch514.htm.
91. See id.
92. Doha Talks India Against Change in Modalities, REDIFF Bus., Aug. 31, 2009, http://business.rediffcom/
report/2 0 09/aug/3 1/wto-doha-talks-india-against-change-in-modalities.htm.
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negotiations and statements that the negotiations were in the "endgame," critics noted
that there were no developments on substance during the September meetings.93
Several subsequent gatherings have taken place since the September meetings in New
Delhi, but none of the discussions have resulted in any substantive progress on the issues
as of the time this Article was submitted for publication. During the September discus-
sions, participants re-affirmed their commitment to a 2010 conclusion to the Doha
Round, which previously had been announced by leaders of the G-8.94 Senior officials
from WTO member countries, including the European Union, United States, Brazil, In-
dia, China, Japan, and others,95 met again in Geneva the week of September 14, and were
tasked with developing work plans on the specific issues. Although there was no progress
on substance, there was an increasing awareness that the multilateral talks would remain
stalled until the United States made further progress with key trading partners,96 particu-
larly India.
India and the United States engaged on a few occasions since the September meetings
in New Delhi. In early October, senior trade officials from the United States, Brazil, and
India met. Brazil and India have been critical of the Obama Administration for failing to
provide specific demands in the talks, while the United States seeks clarity on how Brazil,
India, and China plan on utilizing proposed flexibilities for developing countries to shield
certain agricultural and industrial lines from agreed cuts. 97 These talks were reportedly
unsuccessful.98 Several weeks later, USTR Ron Kirk again met with India's Commerce
Minister Anand Sharma as part of the United States-India Trade Policy Forum. The
United States was accused again during these meetings of neither specifying its demands,
nor providing information on what it was willing to offer in terms of further
concessions.99
The agricultural negotiations regarding the SSM triggered the collapse of the Doha
Round negotiations in July 2008. The aim of the SSM is to protect poor farmers by
allowing countries to impose a special tariff in the event of a drop in prices or surge in
imports. The United States and India were unable to agree on the point at which devel-
oping countries could temporarily raise farm tariffs above maximum WTO-permitted
rates. 00 India argued for the right to start imposing tariffs above their existing maximum
rates when imports exceed ten percent over the previous three-year average and with a
permitted increase thirty percent above existing bound tariff rates.' 0 The United States
93. Vikas Bajaj, At Early Forum on Trade, Few Signs of Concessions, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 5, 2009, http://query.
nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9903EFD81039F936A3575ACOA96F9C8B63&sec=&spon=&page
wanted=all.
94. See Promoting the Global Agenda, Statement by the Leaders of Italy, Brazil, Canada, the People's
Republic of China, France, Germany, India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, the United Kingdom, the
United States of America and the President of the European Commission, together with the Leaders of
Egypt and Sweden, (uly 9, 2009), available at http://pmindia.nic.in/reportl_-09.07.09.pdf.
95. See WTO Members to Meet Sept. 14, FOOD & FIBER LETTER, Sept. 14, 2009.
96. Senior Officials Make Slow Progress On Doba Round In Geneva, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Sept. 18, 2009.
97. Daniel Pruzin, Officials Downbeat After U.S.-India, Brazil Talks in Paris on Doba Round, Int'l Trade Daily,
(BNA) (Oct. 9, 2009).
98. Id.
99. U.S. Ramps Up Bilateral Meetings on Doha Round with Key Countries, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Oct. 9, 2009.
100. Daniel Pruzin & EricJ. Lyman, Doha Talks Collapse Over U.S.-India Dispute On Ag Safeguards; Future of
Round in Doubt, Int'l Trade Daily, (BNA) (uly 30, 2008).
101. Id.
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insisted that it could not accept a threshold lower than a forty percent increase in im-
ports.102 Although India has not shifted from its position on the SSM,103 there have been
indications that some understanding may have been achieved on this issue. WTO Deputy
Director General Harsha Vardhana Singh stated in an October 2009 interview that India's
concerns on the SSM had been addressed at the G-7 level, and that the next step would be
the multilateralism of the agreement.'1 At the time this article was submitted for publica-
tion, details regarding that agreement were not readily available. But there has been little
movement on the other agricultural issues, including the treatment of sensitive products,
tariff capping, and the creation of tariff rate quotas. 5
An important issue on the table in the NAMA negotiations is that of sectorals. Some
Indian officials even feel that the issue of sectorals has replaced differences in the agricul-
tural negotiations as the biggest obstacle in the Doha Round.o 6 Sectoral agreements
commit the parties to cutting import duties in certain sectors more drastically than general
tariff reductions. Sectorals have been proposed in fourteen areas, including auto parts,
bicycles, chemicals, electronics, fish and forestry products, gems, and toys. Participation
in sectorals was supposed to be voluntary, based on a declaration signed at the 2005 V/TO
Hong Kong Ministerial. 07 In 2009, however, developed countries, including the United
States and Australia, have been pushing India, China, and Brazil to commit to such tariff
reductions in at least three sectors, in particular chemicals, auto components, and elec-
tronic items, stating that there will be no Doha deal until India, China, and Brazil agree to
sectoral agreements. 08 India has not been opposed to the sectorals altogether, but it op-
poses on principle any mandatory sectoral tariff reduction for developing countries. 0 9
The NAMA- 11, a coalition of developing countries of which India is a part, issued a state-
ment in 2008 to the chair of the NAMA negotiations that there should be no compromise
language to alter the voluntary status of sectoral negotiations.i 10
The United States has also said that it will not endorse a new agreement unless it con-
tained a comprehensive deal on services,i providing for new market opportunities.1 12
Although Minister Sharma said in October that it was time for negotiations on services to
102. Id.
103. See India Opposed to Reinventing Doha Talks, REDiFF Bus., June 29, 2009, http://business.rediff.com/
special/2009/jun/29/india-opposed-to-reinventing-doha-talks.htm.
104. Asit Ranjan Mishra, Sectoral TariffReductions Emerge as Next Obstacle in WTO Talks, LsvEMiwr, Oct.12,
2009, available at http://www.1ivemint.com/2009/10/1 1225736/Sectoral-tariff-reductions-eme.html.
105. Daniel Pruzin, WTO Chief Warms 2010 Deadline for Doha Hard to Meet Without 'Serious Acceleration', 26
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1414 (Oct. 22, 2009).
106. See SEBI Press Release, supra note 16.
107. Id.
108. Asit Ranjan Mishra, India Urged to Soften Stance on Tariff Cuts, LvIVINT, Sept. 2, 2009, http://
www.livemint.com/2009/09/02223516/lndia-urged-to-soften-stance-o.html.
109. See SEBI Press Release, supra note 16.
110. D. Ravi Kanth, India Snubs US Attempt to Change Doha TariffCut Talks, Bus. STANDARD, Oct. 30, 2008,
http-//www.business-standard.com/india/news/india-snubs-us-attempt-to-change-doha-tariff-cut-talks/
338723/.
111. The WTO listing of services includes a variety of service sectors, including business and professional
services (such as accountancy, advertising, architecture, and legal services), communication services, construc-
tion and related services, distribution services, educational services, energy services, environmental services,
financial services, health and social services, tourism services, and transport services. A complete listing is
provided in the VTO Services Sectoral Classification List, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-el
serv e/serv e.htm.
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proceed,"13 India and other developing countries rejected a move by the United States,
Australia, and Canada to prepare a draft scheduling of commitments in Doha services
negotiations, until other issues, such as the market access commitments in agriculture and
industrial goods, were finalized.'14 For India, a long-standing important issue on services
has been to get concessions from developed countries on Mode 4, which relates to the
movement of persons to work temporarily in other countries. 5 India seeks to increase its
professional workers' ability to go to developed countries to work temporarily.116
"ATO Director General Pascal Lamy has said that an agreement on Doha cannot be
reached by 2010 unless countries accelerate negotiations." 7 While the United States ap-
pears to have taken an all or nothing approach, India advocated a "Doha-lite" approach.'IS
There have been references to a G-2 emerging between China and the United States on
issues of the global economy and climate change.' One might argue that India and the
United States are a G-2 in the context of the Doha Round negotiations, with India among
the most vocal of the developing countries. Certainly, agreement between the two coun-
tries on key issues is going to be essential to a successful outcome in 2010.
V. The Companies Bill, 2009-Impact on Cross Border Investments into
India
Generally, cross-border investments into India occur through joint ventures, acquisi-
tions, establishment of wholly owned subsidiaries, and, of course, venture capital or pri-
vate equity acquisitions. The Companies Bill, 2009 (Bill) proposes to introduce certain
radical changes to the extant Companies Act, 1956 (Act). Some of the relevant changes in
the context of cross-border investments are highlighted in this article.
Under the Act, equity shares with differential rights as to voting, dividend, or otherwise
(DVRs) are permissible, though public companies have restricted ability with regard to
issuance of the same. Due to the availability of DVRs, offshore investments into Indian
companies can easily be customized to meet the economic interests of the investors and
investors may realize certain management rights. The Bill proposes to do away with
DVRs altogether.120 Sections 90 and 170 of the Act exempt private companies from hav-
ing to structure their share capital and convene and hold member meetings strictly as
prescribed under the Act.121 There are no corresponding provisions in the Bill. The
112. Doug Palmer, US. Needs More on Services from Doha Round: Kirk, REUTERS, Oct. 13, 2009, http://
www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSTRE59C2YG20091013.
113. India Wants Balanced and Fair Doha Deal, Dow JONES FACTIVA, Oct. 15, 2009.
114. D. Ravi Kanth, India rejects Draft WTO Services Schedule by US, Bus. STANDARD, Oct. 23, 2009, http://
www.business-standard.com/india/news/india-rejects-draft-wto-services-schedule-by-us/374076/.
115. See Good Mode 4 Offer is Critical for India, FIN. EXPRESS, Dec. 14, 2005, http-J/www.financialexpress.
com/news/good-mode-4-offer-is-critical-for-indial55805/2.
116. Id.
117. Pruzin, supra note 105.
118. Matthias Williams, India Says Doha Deal Does Not Have to Be Perfect, REUTERS, Oct. 30, 2009, http://
in.reuters.com/article/topNews/idlNIndia-43565720091030.
119. See, e.g., China and America: The Odd Couple, EcONOSUsT, Oct. 22, 2009, http://www.economist.com/
opinion/displaystory.cfm?story-id=14699593 (noting, however, that a G-2 between China and America is a
dangerous misperception).
120. See TAXiAN, GUIDE To CoMPANIEs BILL 2009 (2009).
121. See TAXmNNs-s, CORPORATE LAVs (2009).
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withdrawal of these privileges enjoyed by private companies is a retrograde step and will
add to the burdens faced by offshore investors.
Clause 6 of the Bill radically departs from Section 9 of the Act.122 Specifically, there is
no equivalent in the Bill of Section 9(a) or (b) in the Act. This creates a situation where
the Articles of Association (AOA) can have more demanding provisions than those con-
tained in the Act, especially regarding the rights of management and shareholders. Pro-
viso to Clause 6(2) and the provisions of Clause 6(3) of the Bill further strengthen this
burden by allowing reproduction of the provisions of shareholders agreement in the AOA
(and therefore doing away with reservations as to its enforceability in a court of law).123
Section 4(7) of the Act is one of the most convoluted provisions and is often the bone of
contention between lawyers and statutory auditors. This section effectively deems a pri-
vate company (which is a subsidiary of a foreign company) to be a public company under
the Act unless: (i) the foreign company is incorporated as a private company for purposes
of the Act, or (ii) the entire shareholding of the Indian subsidiary is held by one or more
foreign companies alone (whether private or public).124 Given that there is no equivalent
provision under the Bill, a private company, even if it is a subsidiary of a foreign public
company and has Indian shareholders, would still be deemed to be a private company.
The Act states that "the shares or debentures and any interest therein of a company
shall be freely transferable."1 25 The Bill does not contain an equivalent provision. There-
fore, restrictions on a transfer of shares may be enforceable under the Bill, more so given
Clause 6 of the Bill. There are growing concerns as to whether the AOA can contain
restrictions on transferability as between or against a particular block of shareholders (not
being public or unidentified shareholders).
A notable and welcome change is the introduction of a one-person company, which, as
the name suggests, requires just one person to incorporate and manage. This facilitates
setting up 100% subsidiaries without the need to have nominee shareholders.
There have been instances where substantial assets of a company have been sold by the
dominant group without the consent of other shareholders (most notably with offshore
investors). Under the Act, consent of the shareholders is required only if such sale consti-
tutes whole or substantially the whole of the undertaking of the company.126 A sale of
shares of group companies made without the shareholders' consent, even when it consti-
tuted the controlling stake and was the whole of its assets, have been allowed.127 The Bill
addresses this lacuna by defining the term "undertaking" as any investment of the com-
pany which exceeds twenty percent of its net worth or generates twenty percent of the
total income, and defining the phrase "substantially the whole of the undertaking" as
twenty percent or more of the value of the undertaking.128
122. The Companies (Amendment) Bill, 2009, No. 59, Acts of Parliament § 6, 2009 (introduced in the lower
house Lok Sabba on August 3, 2009).
123. Id.
124. The Companies Act, 1956, No. 1, Acts of Parliament § 4(7), 1956.
125. Id. § IllA(2).
126. Id. § 293(1)(a).
127. See CDS Fin. Servs. (Mauritius) Ltd. v. BPL Conunc'ns Ltd., (2004) 121 CC 374 (Mumbai H.C. 2001),
available at http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/1031140/.
128. The Companies (Amendment) Bill No. 59 § 160(a).
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Under the Act, cross-border mergers are permissible, subject to the caveat that the
transferee is required to be an Indian company. Under the Bill, Indian companies may
merge into a foreign company. The Bill exempts mergers between a holding company
and its wholly owned subsidiary and mergers between small companies from the formal
judicial process. Additionally, the Bill enables the merger to be affected by internal ar-
rangements only, subject to registering the same with the registrar and official liquidator.
From the logistics and flexibility perspective, the Bill explicitly provides for participa-
tion by directors in board meetings through video conferencing or other electronic means
as may be prescribed. The Bill further provides that the presence of directors so partici-
pating shall be counted toward quorum. As far as shareholders are concerned, the Bill
introduces the concept of postal ballot voting and electronic voting for unlisted compa-
nies. This will provide comfort for offshore investors concerned about shareholders
meetings being purportedly held without their knowledge.
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